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case seem to indicate that a state legislature can make an
otherwise unconstitutional tax constitutional by rephrasing a
statute so that it purports to tax a local incident, such as the
form of doing business, rather than the privilege of doing
interstate business. This distinction is, however, justified as a
means of safeguarding the federal-state taxing dichotomy
created by the commerce clause, as construed by the United
States Supreme Court.
Judy F. Pierce

CONDITIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF
ACTIO DE IN REM VERSO

Defendant, A-Second Mortgage Co., which held a second
mortgage on the plaintiff's property, agreed to accept the
property in full settlement of its claim and to pay the plaintiffs first mortgage notes on the property as they matured.'
A-Second was relieved of the additional obligation when the
first mortgage was satisfied from proceeds of a life insurance
policy which the plaintiff had previously purchased from and
assigned to the first mortgagee. Realizing that she had lost
both the insurance proceeds and the property, plaintiff sued
the first and second mortgagees for recovery of the amount of
insurance proceeds applied to the first mortgage. Reversing
the First Circuit Court of Appeal, 2 the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that A-Second had been unjustifiably enriched and
that the plaintiff could recover the sum on the basis of an
actio de in rem verso. 3 Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co.,
289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974).
1. Whether A-Second legally assumed the mortgage was never determined. The trial court judge stated that such a determination was not material to the ultimate issues in dispute. Trial Record, 22d J.D.C., Parish of St.
Tammany, #28,064 at 106 (Wallace A. Edwards Div. "B"; June 9, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Trial Record].
2. Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co., 273 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973).
3. The actio de in rem verso derives from Roman law, which provided the
action for the recovery of necessary expenses incurred by a slave, as an
unauthorized agent, for the benefit of his master. W. HUNTER, A SYSTEMATIC
AND HISTORICAL EXPOSITION OF ROMAN LAW IN THE ORDER OF A CODE 616

(3d ed. 1897) [hereinafter cited as HUNTER].
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Relief from unjustified enrichment is a fundamental
principle of the civil law. 4 Although the Louisiana Civil Code
contains many provisions for remedying specific instances of
unjustified enrichment, 5 such as the articles governing acces7
sion 6 and those providing for sales with right of redemption,
no article in the Code provides for a general remedy from
unjustified enrichment.8
Despite a lack of statutory authority, the Louisiana Supreme Court in two early cases 9 drew upon Roman sources 0
and employed the actio de in rem verso as a general remedy
for unjustified enrichment without indicating any guidelines
for its application. Later Louisiana courts ignored the action." To provide relief from unjustified enrichment in situations not specifically provided for in the Civil Code, 12 the
courts either turned to common law remedies such as
waiver-of-tort13 and quantum meruit 14 or expanded negoti4. Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and LouisianaLaw,
Part I, 36 TUL. L. REV. 605, 606 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Nicholas I];
Gutteridge & David, The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment, 5 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 204, 206 (1933).
5. A concordance table of articles in the Civil Codes of France, Quebec,
and Louisiana which includes fifty-six articles of the LA. CIV. CODE is found
in G. CHALLIES, THE DOCTRINE OF UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT IN THE LAW OF
THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC 187 (2d ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as CHALLIES].

6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 502 grants the good faith possessor the products of
the thing possessed, precluding the owner from benefiting from the possessor's labors.
7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2577 gives a purchaser under a condition of redemption the right of removal of or indemnity for augmentations produced at
his own expense.
8. Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in Civil Law and Louisiana Law,
Part II, 37 TUL. L. REV. 49 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Nicholas II].
9. Garland v. Estate of Scott, 15 La. Ann. 143 (1860) (suit on a debt
acknowledged by means of a "due bill" executed by an intestate decedent's
agent; the money had been turned to the use of the intestate); Payne &
Harrison v. Scott, 14 La. Ann. 760 (1859) (suit on debts personally incurred by
tutor which benefited minors).
10. The court in Payne cited the Justinian Digest and the Garland decision was based on the authority of Payne.
11. Nicholas II at 49-58.
12. See text at notes 5-8, supra.
13. The common law remedy allows a plaintiff to "waive the tort" and
sue in assumpsit (quasi-contract) when the commission of a tort results in
enrichment of the defendant. Nicholas II at 51-56. E.g., Kramer v. Freeman,
198 La. 244, 3 So. 2d 609 (1941).
14. Literally, "as much as he deserves." Nicholas II at 58-60. E.g., Town
& Country Contractors, Inc. v. Henderson, 231 La. 131, 90 So. 2d 863 (1956).
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orum gestio'5 and condictio indebitati1 beyond their intended
applications.
In Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc.,17 the Louisiana Supreme Court again turned to the actio de in rem verso as a
general remedy for unjustified enrichment. To limit application of the doctrine, the court, borrowing from French jurisprudence, 8 set forth five conditions limiting its use.' 9 The
three material conditions 20 are that there be an enrichment,
an impoverishment, and a connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment. The court also stated two
juridical conditions: 2' that there be an absence of "justification" or "cause ' 22 for the enrichment and impoverishment
and that no other remedy at law be available to the plaintiff.
The restrictive conditions set out in Minyard severely limits
application of the remedy and expressly classes the action as
23
subsidiary to other modes of relief.
In the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in
allowing the plaintiff to recover on the basis of actio de in rem
verso, reaffirmed the five prerequisites outlined in Minyard.
Since A-Second had acquired the plaintiffs property by
means of an oral engagement to pay plaintiff's first mortgage,
but was relieved of that obligation when the plaintiff herself
paid with the insurance proceeds, 24 it was patrimonially enriched. Because the plaintiff paid the mortgage herself, she
15. A quasi-contract resulting from the management of another's affairs.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2295; Police Jury v. Hampton, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 389 (La. 1927);
HUNTER at 661; Nicholas II at 50.
16. The remedy for a quasi-contract resulting from the payment of
money by mistake. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2301; Roney v. Peyton, 159 So. 469 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1935); HUNTER at 657-60; Nicholas II at 51.
17. 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1967).
18. Nicholas I at 610 and cases cited therein.
19. The conditions originated in French doctrine and were refined by the
courts in both France and Quebec. Nicholas II at 58. For a comparison of
French and German law on the subject of conditions for exercising the
remedy for unjust enrichment, see Nicholas I at 610-46.
20. Material conditions are concerned with the facts of the occurrence.
CHALLIES at 59.
21. Juridical conditions relate to the legal conditions required to implement the remedy. Id.
22. "Cause" is used in its normal sense to mean "justifiable reason" and
should not be confused with the theory of "cause" in contracts.
23. Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 205 So. 2d 422, 432 (1967).
24. The first mortgagee acquiesced in the transaction between A-Second
and the plaintiff and her husband, but refused to release plaintiff from
personal liability. Although the legality of the prior assignment of the insurance proceeds was dubious, the court upheld the payment on the ground that
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was deprived of the benefit of A-Second's promise of payment
and suffered patrimonial impoverishment. 25 The necessary
connection between the impoverishment and the enrichment
existed because the same act of payment caused both conditions to arise. 26 Thus, the three material conditions on the use
of actio de in rem verso were satisfied.
The facts in Edmonston also warranted a judicial finding
that the two juridical conditions for implementation of the
remedy were fulfilled. 27 The court construed the "absence of
justification" requirement as mandating the lack of a valid
juridical act, either between the impoverishee and the enrichee or between the enrichee and a third party, which justified the enrichment. The only juridical act between the
impoverishee-plaintiff and the enrichee-defendant was the
dation2 of plaintiff's property in satisfaction of the second
mortgage. 29 Since the terms of the dation did not specify any
circumstances which would relieve A-Second of its promise to
pay the first mortgagee and since A-Second did not execute
any act with a third party, including the first mortgagee, the
court held the first juridical condition satisfied. Finally, the
majority determined that because the plaintiff would not be
entitled to recover under any other remedy at law, 30 the
subsidiary character of actio de in rem verso would be preserved. 31
Although the court's application of actio de in rem verso
in Edmonston was justified, the opinion may be questioned on
plaintiff executed a release in favor of the first mortgagee with full knowledge of its consequences. 289 So. 2d at 120.
25. Id. at 121.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 122-23. See text at notes 21, 22, supra.
28. A dation en paiement is the giving of a thing to a creditor by his
debtor in payment of a sum which is due. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2655.
29. 289 So. 2d at 122.
30. Plaintiff pleaded the following theories: marshalling of assets, lesion
beyond moiety in the dation, breach of a fiduciary obligation by the first
mortgagee. The trial judge gave no explanation for his conclusion that plaintiff could not recover under those theories. Trial Record at 107. Assuming,
therefore, the trial judge's acceptance and defendant's answer, marshalling
of assets was rejected because of the rights granted under the assignment;
lesion beyond moiety was rejected because the value exceeded the statutory
formula of LA. CIV. CODE art. 1861; and breach of a fiduciary obligation was
rejected either because no obligation was due, or if due, it was not breached.
The Louisiana Supreme Court determined that plaintiff could not recover as
a negotiorum gestor because she did not have an intent to benefit A-Second.
289 So. 2d at 122-23.
31. 289 So. 2d at 123.
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three grounds. First, the court's discussion of enrichment did
not indicate whether an actio de in rem verso might arise
where the form of enrichment is one other than a material
addition to patrimony. In France and Quebec, where actio de
in rem verso is frequently invoked, 32 other forms of enrichment, such as service rendered,3 3 avoidance of a loss or of an
otherwise necessary expenditure, 34 acquisition of a legal
right,35 or even the acquisition of a moral advantage 36 have
satisfied the enrichment requirement. The Edmonston opinion should not be interpreted so as to preclude a similar
expansion of "enrichment" in Louisiana.
The second basis for question arises from the court's narrow definition of absence of justification. Courts in Quebec
have held factors besides a juridical act between the impoverishee and the enrichee or the enrichee and a third party
to be "justification" for an enrichment. 37 In Quebec the action
is precluded when the impoverishee intends to bestow a
gratuity, 38 or when the enrichment results from performance
of a service by a close relative. 39 Likewise, some jurisdictions
bar the action when the impoverishee acts in his own interests, 40 when the enrichee has forbidden the impoverishee
to act for his benefit, 4 1 and when the impoverishment results
from operation of law or from a natural obligation. 42 The
32. CHALLIES at 13.

33. Marion v. Marion & Corp de St. Roch de l'Achigan, 63 S.C. 385 (1925)
(Boyer) (secretary-treasurer of a municipal corporation acting in good faith
though irregularly appointed was able to retain salary paid him); CHALLIES

at 63-66.
34. Alguire v. Leblond, 75 S.C. 130 (1937) (J.B. Archambault) (husband

condemned to reimburse father-in-law for room and board provided his wife
when she took refuge with him).
35. Civ. 6 juil. 1927, S. 1938.1.9 (editor who used operetta without permission condemned to indemnify composer's heirs).
36. Challies gives as an example of an unjustified moral advantage: the
intellectual and aesthetic enrichment of one attending a concert without pay-

ing for his seat. CHALLIES at 71-72. The weight of authority in France and
Quebec favors the view that such is a sufficient enrichment for the action if
either the enrichment or impoverishment is estimable in money. CHALLIES at
71-72 and citations therein.
37. CHALLIES at 13 and citations therein.
38. Gelinas v. Quessy, 71 S.C. 136, 138 (1933) (Lalibert6); CHALLIES at 97.
39. Brassard v. St. Marie, [1922] 33 K.B. 62, 64.
40. Alain v. Frenette, 75 S.C. 177, 180 (1937) (Langlais).
41. Adams v. Adams, [1919] 28 K.B. 278.
42. Nyczka v. Soeurs de Charite, (1944) S.C. 119 (Casgrain) (inmate in

mental hospital unable to recover value of labors because statute authorized
defendant to retain benefit of such work).
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court's failure to recognize expressly these additional justifications for enrichment may result in relief being granted
when circumstances are inappropriate in later cases.
The most serious criticism of the court's opinion concerns
its conception of the subsidiary character of the remedy, 43 an
interpretation which might unduly restrict future application
of the action. The court's statement that the action will be
allowed only when the plaintiff has no other remedy at law
adopts earlier, more conservative views of the action." In
contrast, modern civilian jurisprudence reflects the more liberal doctrinal notion that the action is subsidiary only in a
limited sense. 45 Current French and Canadian theory asserts
that so long as no imperative rule of law is contravened, 46 the
action will lie even though another equally advantageous
action can be taken presently or could have been taken had
47
the impoverishee acted in time.
The court's acceptance of the more conservative theory
apparently results from a misunderstanding of the conceptual basis of the action. Doctrine is divided on the issue of the
legal basis of actio de in rem verso, with the following theories
advanced in explanation: extraordinary negotiorumgestio,48 a
43. Confusion and apparent misapplication of the fourth requirement are
evident, in light of Edmonston, in the one actio de in rein verso case occurring
between the dates of Minyard and Edmonston. In Joslyn v. Manship, 238 So.
2d 20 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), the court formulates the issue as whether
defendants' actions were justified, rather than whether the resulting enrichment was justified.
44. "L'action de in rem verso" (lies only. when the impoverishee) "ne
jouirait pour obtenir ce qui lui est da d'aucume action raissant d'un contrat,
d'un quasi-contrat, d'un d6lit ou d'un quasi-d6lit." C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, 9
°
COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS, n 578 at 361 (5th ed. 1917).
45. See CHALLIES at 118-44 (comparison of the doctrine and jurisprudence in Quebec and France); GUTTERIDGE & DAVID at 212; Nicholas I at
633-41. See, e.g., Harris v. Royal Victoria Hospital, [1948] K.B. 28, 32; Ville de
Louisville v. Ferron, [1947] K.B. 438, 443.
46. The prohibition against indirect contravention of imperative rules of
law is usually expressed as "no fraude a la loi." CHALLIES at 119. Such a
non-restrictive view of subsidiary character would allow the action in all
cases where positive law would not otherwise preclude plaintiff's recovery,
rather than permitting its assertion only when plaintiff has no other mode of
recovery.
47. The court's language in Edmonston indicates a failure to recognize
the distinction between the two competing views of "subsidiary character,"
as evidenced by its interchangeable use of'the terms "fraud on the law" and
"no remedy available." 289 So. 2d at 122-23.
48. The action is considered as an auxilliary of negotiorum gestio and is
to be used when the technical requirements of that quasi-contract cannot be
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quasi-offense of the enrichee, 49 an equitable obligation of an
enrichee to restore enrichment due to an act of the impoverishee, 50 the equitable right to preserve one's patrimony,5 ' the imposition of a moral duty by equity, 52 the
jurisprudential creation of unjust enrichment as a separate
source of obligations-ultimately a product of both morals and
54
equity, 53 and quasi-contract.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Minyard clearly stated
that an actio de in rem verso is quasi-contractual in nature 55
under the express law of Louisiana Civil Code articles 2293
and, 2294.56 The court also cited article 2157 and thereby introduced the concept of "equity" into the action. In Edmonston
the court abandoned its previous reference to quasi-contract
and relied exclusively upon article 21 and "natural justice" as
the source of the actio de in rem verso. 58 Of the theories
advanced as the basis of actio de in rem verso, the Edmonston
position seems more nearly to coincide with either moral
duty59 or jurisprudential creation. The former has been
fulfilled, as for example when one manages the affairs of another while under
the impression that they are his own. C. DEMOLOMBE, COURS DE CODE
NAPOLEON 46 (1882).
49. 2 M. PLANIOL, TRAIT ItLtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no 935 at 359
(11th ed. 1939).
50. CHALLIEs at 38-41.
51. 3 R. DEMOGUE, TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL, no 79 at 124
(1923).
52. G. RIPERT, LA REGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES n o 138.
at 257 (2d ed. 1927).
53. 2 A. COLIN ET H. CAPITANT, COURS tLtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL
°
FRANCAIS n 6 at 6 (8th ed. 1934).
54. 15 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET L. BARDE, TRAITP, THEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, n0 2849 at 519 (3d ed. 1908).
55. Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 205 So. 2d 422, 432 (1967).
56. The language of LA. CIV. CODE art. 2294, "but there are two principal
kinds ...
" indicates other quasi-contracts exist besides those specifically
mentioned therein. Toullier is of the opinion that there are many quasicontracts. 11 M. TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIS, n ° 112 at 135 (1824).
57. The article is a mandate to the judiciary to decide cases where there
is no express law and to apply the equity of natural law and reason or
received usages where positive law is silent.
58. 289 So. 2d at 120. The court also cited LA. CIV. CODE art. 1965, a
maxim prohibiting unjust enrichment in the judicial construction of ambiguous contracts. In light of the purposes of the article, it is difficult to perceive'
the court's reasons for citing it. Nicholas I at 605.
59. The moral duty not to enrich oneself at the expense of another can be
viewed as correlative to the moral duty not to injure another, which is the
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criticized as vague, 60 while the latter is deemed unacceptable
since it is also vague 6 1 and, more importantly, violates the
principle of Louisiana Civil Code articles 1760 and 2292, which
limit the sources of legal obligations to contracts, quasicontracts, offenses, quasi-offenses and obligations imposed by
law. 6 2 The idea that the actio de in rem verso is founded upon
article 21 and natural justice is open to the same criticism.
On the other hand, quasi-contract has been favored as
the basis of the action 63 because it gives as a basis for the
obligation a legal institution recognized by express legislation
to be a source of obligations." In addition, since Louisiana
Civil Code article 21 is to be used only in the absence of
express law, recognition that actio de in rem verso is quasicontractual in nature may more readily allow the remedy to
be applied even when the plaintiff has other remedies at law,
so long as no positive rule of law is contravened,6 5 aligning
66
Louisiana law with modern civilian theory.
The Louisiana courts should draw on the extensive doctrine and jurisprudence of those jurisdictions in which the
action de in rem verso has been more fully developed to formulate the proper conceptual basis of the action and allow
greater flexibility in its application. The five conditions imposed upon the use of the action in other civilian jurisdictions, especially the expanded interpretation of the absence
of justification requirement, would adequately contain the
potential abuses of unbridled judicial discretion which troubled the Minyard and Edmonston courts.
Stewart McCaa Thomas

basis of civil responsibility. G. RIPERT, LA REGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES n ° 3 at 7 (2d ed. 1927).
60. CHALLIEs at 44.

61. Id. at 45.
62. The latter include tutorship and other legal administrations. Cf. LA.
Civ. CODE arts. 1760, 2292.
63. CHALLIEs at 46-57.
64. Id. at 49.
65. Analogy is made from French and Canadian theory. See text at notes
47, 48, supra and CHALLIEs at 46-47.
66. The statement assumes that the court's view of "subsidiary character" was predicted at least to some extent by the text of LA. CIv. CODE art. 21
as is indicated at 289 So. 2d at 122.

